Internet Appendix for
"The Cross-Section of Household Preferences"

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This Internet Appendix provides additional information on the methodology used in the paper. Section 1 presents the organization of the Swedish pension system. Section 2 discusses the estimation of the labor income process. Section 3 explains details of the indirect inference methodology, and Section 4 provides the method used to estimate cross-sectional heterogeneity.

1   The Swedish Pension System

This Section explains the rules of the Swedish pension system applying to households in the 1999 to 2007 sample. Section 1.1 defines key indexes used in the calculation of pensions. Section 1.2 discusses the organization of public pensions, and Section 1.3 the organization of occupational pensions. Section 1.4 explains the allocation rule of the default fund in the public DC pension system. Section 1.5 describes the imputation of private pension contributions and wealth. Section 1.6 analyzes the impact of taxation.

1.1   Key Indexes

The calculations of public and occupational pensions rely on the following three income indexes defined in the Swedish Social Insurance Code.

- PBB_t denotes the "price-related base amount" (*prisbasbelopp*). It is set by the government based on calculations produced by Statistic Sweden.

- $HBPA_t$ is the "higher price-related base amount" (*förhöjt prisbasbelopp*). It is set by the government based on calculations produced by Statistic Sweden.

- IBB_t denotes the "income-related base amount" (*inkomstbasbelopp*). It is set by the government based on calculations produced by the Swedish Pensions Agency.

The price-related base amount, PBB_t, and the higher price-related base amount, $HBPA_t$, are available from Statistics Sweden's website. The income-related base amount, IBB_t, is available from the Swedish Parliament's website. For the year 2003, the price-related base amount is 38,600 SEK, the higher-price related base amount is 39,400 SEK, and the income-related base amount is 40,900 SEK.

1

1.2 Public Pension System

The Swedish Pensions Agency administers both the defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) components of public pensions.[2] An individual's public pension has four components:

(i) the DB income pension (*inkomstpension*), $IP_{i,t}$, which is based on the individual's lifetime income;

(ii) the DC premium pension (*premiepension*), $PPM_{i,t}$, which is contingent on the returns on the compulsory DC premium pension contributions invested by the individual;

(iii) the DB guaranteed pension (*garantipension*), $GP_{i,t}$, if the individual has a low income pension $IP_{i,t}$ or no earnings-related pensions;

(iv) the DB supplementary pension (*tilläggspension*), $ATP_{i,t}$, if the individual is born in 1953 or earlier.

Our terminology closely matches the terminology used in the annual Orange Reports of the Swedish Pensions Authority (see, e.g., 2005, 2015). Sections 1.2.1 to 1.2.4 of this Internet Appendix provide detailed definitions of the four components of public pensions.

An individual born after 1953 receives a total public pension equal to

$$\text{Public Pension}_{i,t} = IP_{i,t} + PPM_{i,t} + GP_{i,t}. \tag{1}$$

An individual born in 1953 or earlier receives

$$\text{Public Pension}_{i,t} = \begin{cases} ATP_{i,t} + GP_{i,t} & \text{if born before 1938,} \\ 4/20\ (IP_{i,t} + PPM_{i,t}) + 16/20\ ATP_{i,t} + GP_{i,t} & \text{if born in 1938,} \\ 5/20\ (IP_{i,t} + PPM_{i,t}) + 15/20\ ATP_{i,t} + GP_{i,t} & \text{if born in 1939,} \\ \cdots \\ 19/20\ (IP_{i,t} + PPM_{i,t}) + 1/20\ ATP_{i,t} + GP_{i,t} & \text{if born in 1953.} \end{cases} \tag{2}$$

All variables in (1) and (2) are pre-tax. The implications of taxes on public and occupational pensions are analyzed in Section 1.4.

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[2] See the Swedish Pensions Agency's website (https://www.pensionsmyndigheten.se) and Röstberg et al. (2004) for detailed explanations.

1.2.1 DB Income Pension

The DB income pension is a pay-as-you-go system that applies to households in all cohorts, as defined by the 1998 Earnings Related Old Age Pension Act. The rules of the income pension system mimic the organization of individual funded accounts. During an individual's working life, contributions are credited to a notional individual account. Each year a notional interest payment is credited to the account. At retirement, the notional account becomes an annuity, whose amount is determined by the individual's notional balance and his/her cohort's life expectancy.

The precise calculation of the DB income pension proceeds in three steps.

Step 1 (Notional accumulation). The notional accumulation is computed from annual income and credits as follows.

- The relevant income of individual i in year t, $RI_{i,t}$, consists of the year's annual earnings, including sickness cash benefits, parental cash benefits, and unemployment cash benefits.

- The pension qualifying income, $PQI_{i,t}$, is defined as

$$PQI_{i,t} = RI_{i,t} - 7\% \times \min(RI_{i,t}, 8.07 \ IBB_t),$$

  where IBB_t is the income-related base amount defined in Section 1.1.

- The pension qualifying amount, $PQA_{i,t}$, is a fictitious income computed for years of child care, compulsory national service, studies, and sickness or activity compensation.[3]

- The pension base (*pensionunderlag*) is the sum of the pension-qualifying income and pension-qualifying amounts, capped at 7.5 times the income-related base amount:

$$\text{Pension Base}_{i,t} = \max[PQI_{i,t} + PQA_{i,t} \ ; \ 7.5 \ IBB_t]. \tag{3}$$

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[3]Pension-qualifying amounts for *child care* apply for a period of up to 4 years after a child's birth; the pension-qualifying amount in year t is the maximum of the following three quantities: (i) the parent's pension-qualifying income in the year prior to the child's birthyear, (ii) 75% of year t's average pension-qualifying income of all insured persons aged between 16 and 64, and (iii) the year's income-related base amount, IBB_t. The pension-qualifying amount for *compulsory national service* is set to 50% of the average pensionable qualifying-income for all insured persons aged between 16 and 64. Pension-qualifying amounts for *study* are calculated as 138% of disbursed study grants. Pension-qualifying amounts for *sickness and activity compensation* are set to 93% of the income that the insured person would have likely received if he/she had worked according to the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (*Försäkringskassan*). See Swedish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2009) for further details.

Beginning in 2003, the pension base is zero if $PQI_{i,t} + PQA_{i,t}$ is lower than $42.3\% \times PBB_t$.

- The pension right accumulated by individual i in year t is

$$\text{Pension Right}_{i,t} = 16.0\% \times \text{Pension Base}_{i,t}.$$

Step 2 (Notional balance). The notional *pension balance at t* is

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Pension Balance}_{i,t} \quad = \quad & 99.95\% \times \text{Inheritance Gain Factor}_{i,t} \qquad\qquad (4)\\
& \times \left[\sum_{t=S_i}^{T_i} \left(\text{Pension Right}_{i,t} \times \frac{\text{IncIndex}_{T_i}}{\text{IncIndex}_t} \right) \right],
\end{aligned}$$

where Inheritance Gain Factor$_{i,t}$ is specific to the individual's cohort in year t, S_i is the individual's first year with a strictly positive pension-qualifying income, T_i is the year of retirement which is typically the 65th birthday, and is at the earliest the 61st birthday. IncIndex$_t$ is the income index for year t. The 99.95% factor corresponds to administrative costs of 0.05%.

The inheritance gain factor (*arvvinstfaktorer*) is computed by the National Social Insurance Board (*Riksförsäkringsverket*). It is designed to allocate the pension balances of deceased persons to survivors in the same age group. For cohorts up to the age of 60, the inheritance gain factor is equal to unity plus the ratio of the pension balances of the deceased to the pension balances of survivors. For cohorts aged more than 60, the inheritance gain factor is a survival rate, which permits the homogeneous treatment of economically active and retired individuals in the same cohort.[4]

The Income Index is computed by the National Social Insurance Board and is available from its website. By definition, the growth rate of the income index, IncIndex$_t$/IncIndex$_{t-1}$, is the product of 1-year inflation with the 3-year moving average of real earnings.[5]

Step 3 (Payout). The annual DB income pension is calculated by dividing the individual's pension account balance (4) by his/her cohort's annuitization divisor (*delningstal*):

$$IP_{i,t} = \frac{\text{Pension Balance}_{i,t}}{\text{Annuitization Divisor}_i}.$$

The annuitization divisor is computed by the National Social Insurance Board. It is common to individuals born in the same year and does not vary after age 65.

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[4]The exact definitions of the Inheritance Gain Factor is provided in Appendix A of Swedish Pensions Agency (e.g., 2005).

[5]See Appendix A of Swedish Pensions Agency (e.g., 2005).

1.2.2 DC Premium Pension

The DC component of public pensions, which was introduced in 1995, is designed as a funded system. During the working life of individual i, the DC premium contribution in every year t is

$$\text{Premierate}_i \times \text{Pension Base}_{i,t},$$

where Pension Base$_{i,t}$ is given by (3). The rate of contribution, Premierate$_i$, is 2.5% for years 1999 and later, and 2% in years 1995-1998. Premium pension contributions are invested by default in the AP7 fund (see section 1.4 for details). Individual can opt out and choose funds among a large menu of mutual funds available in the system.[6]

At retirement, the insured person can either convert the funds into an annuity or keep them invested in mutual funds.

- If the individual chooses to receive an annuity, the pension is calculated as a guaranteed life-long annuity payable in nominal monthly instalments.

- Alternatively, the pension savings remain in the account and are invested in mutual funds chosen by the insured. The premium pension is recalculated once a year based on the value of fund shares in December.

In both cases, the premium pension, $PPM_{i,t}$, is the value of the premium pension account divided by an annuity divisor, which is based on forecasts of future life expectancy.[7]

1.2.3 DB Guaranteed Pension

The guaranteed pension provides basic retirement income for individuals who have had little or no previous earnings. Unlike other components of the public pension system, the guaranteed pension is funded by the state budget. Residents of Sweden are eligible beginning at age 65. In order to obtain a maximum guaranteed pension, one needs to have resided in Sweden for 40 years after age 25.[8] In our simulations, we assume for simplicity that all households meet this criterion.

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[6] In June 2003, 655 funds were available for active choice on the Premium pension platform

[7] See Appendix A of Swedish Pensions Agency (e.g., 2005) for further details.

[8] Years of residence in another EU or EEA country also provide guaranteed pension credits.

The level of the guaranteed pension is determined by the DB income pension, $IP_{i,t}$, defined in Section 1.2.1. The guaranteed pension, $GP_{i,t}$, is given by

$$GP_{i,t} = \begin{cases} 2.13\ PBB_t - IP_{i,t} & \text{when } IP_{i,t} < 1.26\ PBB_t \\ 0.87\ PBB_t - 0.48(IP_{i,t} - 1.26\ PBB_t) & \text{when } 1.26\ PBB_t \le IP_{i,t} \le 3.07\ PBB_t \\ 0 & \text{when } IP_{i,t} > 3.07\ PBB_t \end{cases}$$

for unmarried individuals, and by

$$GP_{i,t} = \begin{cases} 1.90\ PBB_t - IP_{i,t} & \text{when } IP_{i,t} < 1.14\ PBB_t \\ 0.76\ PBB_t - 0.48(IP_{i,t} - 1.14\ PBB_t) & \text{when } 1.14\ PBB_t < IP_{i,t} < 2.72\ PBB_t \\ 0 & \text{when } IP_{i,t} > 2.72\ PBB_t \end{cases}$$

for married pensioners, where PBB_t is the price-related base amount defined in Section 1.1.

1.2.4 DB Supplementary Pension

Individuals born in 1953 or earlier are entitled to a public DB supplementary pension, which can be computed in three steps.

Step 1. We compute the individual's 15 best years of earnings, out of 30. For each of these 15 years we calculate:

$$\text{Pension Points}_{i,t} = (PQI_{i,t} - HBPA_t)/HBPA_t, \tag{5}$$

where $HBPA_t$ is the higher price-related base amount defined in Section 1.1. The average pension points for the best 15 years is denoted by AvPoints_i.

Step 2. The annual supplementary DB pension is

$$SuppDB_{i,t} = 60\% \times \text{AvPoints}_i \times PBB_t, \tag{6}$$

where PBB_t is the price-related base amount. An individual needs to work 30 years in order to get the full supplementary DB pension. The benefit (6) is otherwise multiplied by a factor of $N/30$, where N is the number of years for which the individual received pension rights. In our simulations, we set N equal to 30 for all individuals in the panel.

Step 3. We compute the *folkspension*:

$$Folkspension_{i,t} = \begin{cases} 96\% \times PBB_t & \text{for an unmarried person,} \\ 78.5\% \times PBB_t & \text{for a married person,} \end{cases}$$

where PBB_t is the price-related base amount.

Step 4. The total supplementary pension is

$$ATP_{i,t} = SuppDB_{i,t} + Folkspension_{i,t}.$$

1.3   Occupational Pension System

We now provide a detailed description of some of the main collective labor agreements in Sweden:

- STP and SAF-LO, which cover private-sector blue collar workers (1.3 million persons in 2002);

- ITP2, which covers private-sector white collar workers (610,000 persons in 2002);

- PA 91 and PA 03, which cover central government employees (250,000 persons in 2002);

- PFA 98 and KAP-KL, which cover local government employees (940,000 persons in 2002).

Overall, these agreements cover about 90% of the Swedish workforce. We refer the reader to Sjögren and Wadensjö (2005, ch. 6.4.1) for an excellent detailed description of these occupational plans.

1.3.1   Private-Sector Blue Collar Workers

In 1973, the Swedish Employers Association (SAF) and the central confederation of blue-collar workers (LO) agreed to provide a special defined benefit pension plan, the *särskild tilläggspension* (STP). The STP introduced a defined contribution component in 1991, which came into effect in 1992. Since 1996, the main pension scheme for blue-collar workers is the SAF-LO defined contribution agreement. However, workers previously enrolled in the STP defined benefit scheme still receive pension payments between 1999 and 2007.

Defined Benefits. Yearly DB pension payouts are given by

$$10\% \times (\text{relevant pension points} + 1) \times PBB_t,$$

7

where the relevant pension points are defined as the average of Pension Points$_{i,t}$ (defined in (5)) over the best 3 years between the ages of 55 and 59. Following the introduction of SAF-LO, the DB pension payouts are adjusted for birthyear using the same ratios as the ones applied to the public DC premium pension discussed in Section 1.2.2.

Defined Contributions. The average yearly premium is

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
0.53\% \times PQI_{i,t} & \text{in 1992,} \\
0.54\% \times PQI_{i,t} & \text{in 1993 and 1994,} \\
3.90\% \times PQI_{i,t} & \text{in 1996,} \\
4.08\% \times PQI_{i,t} & \text{in 1997,} \\
3.50\% \times PQI_{i,t} & \text{from 1998 to 2007.}
\end{array} \tag{7}
$$

There was no contribution in 1995 as the pension system transitioned to a pure defined contribution scheme.

The premium in (7) is the sum of the contributions paid by both the worker and the employer. Specifically, the worker and the employer respectively contributed $2\% \times PQI_{i,t}$ and $1.9\% \times PQI_{i,t}$ to the pension plan in 1996, $2\% \times PQI_{i,t}$ and $2.08\% \times PQI_{i,t}$ in 1997, and $2\% \times PQI_{i,t}$ and $1.5\% \times PQI_{i,t}$ in 1998 and 1999. Starting in 2000, employees pay a contribution of $3.5\% \times PQI_{i,t}$ (no ceiling), and there are no contributions from employers.

The age at which defined contributions start accruing is 28 until 1999, 22 in 2000 and 2001, and 21 in 2002 onward. DC premia continue to be paid if the worker is on sick leave, pregnancy leave, or parental leave.[9] Blue collar workers covered by SAF-LO can allocate their contributions to traditional insurance (characterized by conservative investments and guaranteed payments) and unit-linked insurance (riskier investments).

1.3.2 Private-Sector White Collar Workers

The *industrins och handelns tilläggspension* (ITP) covers white-collar workers from the private sector. It consists of two schemes: ITP2 for members born before 1979 and ITP1 for members born therafter. ITP1 is not relevant for our paper and is therefore not discussed here. In addition, the ITPK agreement was introduced in 1977 as a compulsory DC scheme for private-sector white collar workers (Hagen 2013).

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[9]In these cases, the premia are paid by an insurance tool, called *premiebefrielseförsäkring*, instead of being deducted from the salary. The rationale is that long-term illness, for instance, should not result in lower occupational pension on retirement.

Defined Benefits. ITP2 provides a specific share of the final salary after thirty years of service. Let $SIYBR_i$ denote the salary in the year before retirement. The ITP2 DB payout is given by the following formula:

$$(10\% \times \text{portion of } SIYBR_i \text{ below 7.5 } IBB)$$
$$+(65\% \times \text{portion of } SIYBR_i \text{ between 7.5 } IBB \text{ and 20 } IBB)$$
$$+(32.5\% \times \text{portion of } SIYBR_i \text{ between 20 } IBB \text{ and 30 } IBB).$$

Levels of $SIYBR_i$ above 30 IBB do not provide an ITP2 payout. Before 2003, the formula was based on the increased price base amount, $HBPA$, instead of the income base amount, IBB.

Defined Contributions. The yearly contribution to the ITPK defined-contribution plan is

$$2\% \times \min(PQI_{i,t}; 30 \ IBB_t)$$

over the entire period, where $PQI_{i,t}$ is the pension qualifying income that applies to enrolled workers. Workers start contributing to the ITPK plan at age 28. DC premia continue to be paid if the worker is on sick leave, pregnancy leave, or parental leave.

Before 1990, the ITPK plan was handled as if each payment gave rise to a benefit and ITPK payouts were part of the collective refund (i.e. with base year and pension allowance). Pre-1990 ITPK can thererefore be seen as a hybrid between a defined contribution and a defined benefit plan. In 1990 this changed and it became possible to invest ITPK premia in garanteed or unit-linked products provided by companies such as Collectum or Valcentralen. For these reasons, we include pre-1990 ITPK in the DB payout defined for regular ITP2.

High Earners. Workers earning more than 7.5 IBB_t in a given year, who are known as *tiotaggare* (high earners), are entitled to leave their standard ITP arrangement and join a defined contribution scheme, in agreement with their employer. According to Collectum (2015), the contributions to these alternative schemes, are calculated using either the *frilagd premie* (free premium) or the *premietrappa* (premium ladder) for the portion of income between 7.5 IBB_t and 30 IBB_t.

Our dataset does not provide the type of premium chosen by high earners and their employers. However, a feature of the system allow us to make a simplifying assumption. The "free premium" matches the costs the employers would incur within the DB component of ITP 2; it tends to vary substantially, which makes it difficult for employers to budget and control their pension costs. By contrast, the "premium ladder" is stable and easy to budget, and the variation of pension premia with age and salary levels can easily be explained to

employees. The premium ladder is therefore the more popular option, so we assume that high earners who leave the ITP 2 system always choose the "premium ladder."

The dataset does not allow us to determine if a high earner is enrolled in the ITP 2 system or in an alternative scheme. As a compromise, we assume that a high earner invests half of the premium in the ITP 2 DB scheme and the other half in the alternative DC scheme.

1.3.3 Central Government Employees

Central government employees are covered by two agreements: PA 91 from 1992 to 2002, and PA 03 since 2003.

Defined Benefits. The pension basis is the average of the 5 last salaries before retirement. The PA 91 defined benefit payout is

$(10\% \times$ portion of pension basis below 7.5 $HBPA_t)$

$+(65\% \times$ portion of pension basis between 7.5 $HBPA_t$ and 20 $HBPA_t)$

$+(32.5\% \times$ portion of pension basis between 20 $HBPA_t$ and 30 $HBPA_t)$.

The PA 03 defined benefit payout is

$(0\% \times$ portion of pension basis below 7.5 $HBPA_t)$

$+(60\% \times$ portion of pension basis between 7.5 $HBPA_t$ and 20 $HBPA_t)$

$+(30\% \times$ portion of pension basis between 20 $HBPA_t$ and 30 $HBPA_t)$.

Payments of PA 91 continued after the introduction of PA 03 for persons born before 1943.

Defined Contributions. Yearly PA 91 pension contributions are made under the Kåpan scheme and are defined as follows:

$$1.5\% \times PQI_{i,t} \text{ in years 1992 to 1994,}$$
$$1.7\% \times PQI_{i,t} \text{ in years 1995 to 2002,}$$

for workers who are at least 28 years of age. DC premia continue to be paid if the worker is on sick leave, pregnancy leave, or parental leave.

Yearly PA 03 pension contributions are made up of two parts: the *individuell ålderspension* premium and the Kåpan premium.[10] From the age of 23, central government employees

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[10]Source: Sjögren & Wadensjö (2005:160,162,180) and to page 6 of the pension brochure of Arbetsgivarverket, "the Swedish Agency for Government Employers",

pay the *individuell ålderspension* premium:

$$2.3\% \times PQI_{i,t} \text{ in 2003,}$$
$$2\% \times PQI_{i,t} \text{ thereafter.}$$

From the age of 28, employees also pay the Kåpan premium:

$$1.9\% \times PQI_{i,t} \text{ in 2003,}$$
$$2.3\% \times PQI_{i,t} \text{ thereafter.}$$

Central government employees younger than 23 pay no DC contributions.

1.3.4 Local Government Employees

Local government workers are covered by two occupational pensions schemes during the period: PFA 98 between 1998 and 2006, and KAP-KL thereafter.

Defined Benefits. For the 1999 to 2006 period, the PFA 98 pension payout is

$$(0\% \times \text{portion of pension basis below 7.5 } IBB_t)$$
$$+(62.5\% \times \text{portion of pension basis between 7.5 } IBB_t \text{ and 20 } IBB_t)$$
$$+(31.25\% \times \text{portion of pension basis between 20 } IBB_t \text{ and 30 } IBB_t),$$

where the pension payout basis is the annual average salary in the 5 best years out of the last 7 years before retirement. For the year 2007, the pension payout specified by KAP-KL, whose definition is provided in Table IA.IV of this Internet Appendix.

Defined Contributions. The DC premia are not the same whether the employes is a union member of (i) OFR-förbunden and Akademikeralliansen or (ii) Kommunal. Unfortunately, the data set does not provide the union membership of individual employees. Since the OFR-förbunden and Akademikeralliansen have more members overall, we apply their pension rules to all local government employees.

For the period 1998-2006, the PFA 98 premium is

$$3.5\% \times (\text{portion of } PQI_{i,t} \text{ up to 7.5 } HBPA_t)$$
$$+1.1\% \times (\text{portion of } PQI_{i,t} \text{ above 7.5 } HBPA_t),$$

11

where $PQI_{i,t}$ is the pension-qualifying income. For 2007, the KAP-KL yearly premium is[11]:

$$4\% \times (\text{portion of } PQI_{i,t} \text{ up to } 30 \ IBB).$$

Between 1998 and 2004, DC premia are paid by local government employees who are at least 28 years old. In 2004, that age was reduced to 21 for many local government employees. DC premia continue to be paid if the worker is on sick leave, pregnancy leave, or parental leave.

1.4   Allocation Rule of the PPM Default Fund

To calculate retirement wealth held in the PPM system, we assume that it is invested fully in the AP7 fund, which is the default option in the DC public pension system (PPM). According to the AP7 fund policy during our sample period, each worker's PPM wealth is invested in only two funds: the AP7 Fixed Income Fund (*AP7 Räntefond*) and the AP7 Equity Fund (*AP7 Aktiefond*). The fixed income fund is effectively invested in the risk free rate. The equity fund is 130% levered in the unhedged MSCI World Index.

The allocation depends on the age of the worker. Until age 55, the AP7 fund is fully invested in the equity fund. At 56, the weight of equity fund is 97%. Between 57 and 60, the share of the equity fund decreases by 3.5 percentage points per year to 83%. Between 61 and 65 years of age, the share of the equity fund decreases by 3.2 percentage points per year to 67%. Between 66 and 70 years of age, it decreases by 3.4 percentage points per year until it is 50% at 70 years old.

To convert this proportion into the equity share invested in the unlevered MSCI World Index, we multiply the allocation in the equity fund by 130%.

1.5   Private Pension Contributions and Wealth

This section discusses the organization of the private pension system in Sweden and the imputation of individual private pension contribution and wealth. The Swedish wealth register contains exact information on private pension contributions from 1994, and only reports a capped version of the variable from 1991. We impute full contributions from 1991 to 1993 using information in the years during which we observe both variables (i.e. 1994 onwards). More specifically, for each of the three education groups, we separately estimate the following individual fixed effect regression model over the years 1994 to 2007:

$$\log(T_{i,t}) = a_i + b_1 RI_{i,t}^1 + ... + b_{20} RI_{i,t}^{20} + c\log(C_{i,t}) + c_1 C_{i,t}^1 + ... + c_{20} C_{i,t}^{20} + c_{21} age_{i,t}^{21} + ... + c_{64} age_{i,t}^{64} + e_{i,t}$$

[11] Source: OFR (2012, p. 21).

where $T_{i,t}$ is the true contribution and $C_{i,t}$ is the capped contribution. Variables with superscripts are dummy variables. That is, $RI_{i,t}^1$, ..., $RI_{i,t}^{20}$ are dummies for equally spaced percentiles (9-5%, 5%-10%, ..., 90%-95%, 95%-100%) of the relevant income variable defined in Section 1.2.1. Similarly, $C_{i,t}^1$,..., $C_{i,t}^{20}$ are dummies for equally spaced percentiles of the capped contribution. We use the estimated model to predict individual contributions $T_{i,t}$ over the years 1991-1993.[12]

Since we do not have information on private pension contribution before 1991, we redistribute the aggregate stock of private pension wealth held by the working population in proportion to the individual share of private pension contributions in 1991. To calculate the stock of private pension wealth held by the working population we proceed in two steps. First, in 1991, the national accounts do not distinguish between private pensions and capital insurance (kapitalförsäkring), and only report the aggregate stock of both. We take the closest year national accounts have information on the split, and use the 80/130 fraction reported in 1989. Second, as noted in the main text, we follow Bach, Calvet and Sodini (2020) and further assume that 58% of private pension wealth in 1991 belongs to workers.

1.6   Taxation of DC Contributions and DB Payouts

The tax rate for withdrawing your pension before the age of 65 is higher than the tax rate for withdrawing the pension after the age of 65.

First, we calculate the tax rate on the pension income of already retired people, splitting them into three education groups (basic or missing education, high school, post-high school).

Second, we apply the obtained tax rate (specific for each education group) from the retired people and tax with it the DB payouts of the working/retiring people having the same education level. On average, the tax rate is almost invariably about 32% irrespective of education level. Additionally, the standard deviations of the tax rate by education level are negligibly small. We then tax the DC accumulations with a flat rate of 32%.

2   Estimation of Labor Income Process

As the main text explains, we consider the labor income specification:

$$\log(Y_{h,t}) = a_c + b'x_{h,t} + \nu_{h,t} + \varepsilon_{h,t}, \tag{8}$$

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[12]We exclude observations for which the true variable or the capped variable are equal to zero.

where $Y_{h,t}$ denotes real income for household h in year t, a_c is a cohort fixed effect, $x_{h,t}$ is a vector of characteristics, $\nu_{h,t}$ is a permanent random component of income, and $\varepsilon_{h,t}$ is a transitory component.

We enrich the model of Carroll and Samwick (1997) by distinguishing between shocks that are common to all households in a group and shocks that are specific to each household in the group. To simplify notation, we neglect the group index g in the rest of this section. We assume that the permanent component of income, $\nu_{h,t}$, is the sum of a group-level component, ξ_t, and an idiosyncratic component, $z_{h,t}$:

$$\nu_{h,t} = \xi_t + z_{h,t}. \tag{9}$$

The components ξ_t and $z_{h,t}$ follow independent random walks:

$$\xi_t = \xi_{t-1} + u_t, \tag{10}$$
$$z_{h,t} = z_{h,t-1} + w_{h,t}. \tag{11}$$

We assume that the three income shocks are i.i.d. Gaussian:

$$(u_t, w_{h,t}, \varepsilon_{h,t})' \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \Omega) \tag{12}$$

where Ω is the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements σ_u^2, σ_w^2, and σ_e^2.

We estimate the labor income process as follows. Consider

$$y_{h,t} = \log(Y_{h,t}) - a_c - b' x_{h,t}.$$

We infer from equation (8) that

$$y_{h,t} = \nu_{h,t} + \varepsilon_{h,t} = \xi_t + z_{h,t} + \varepsilon_{h,t}.$$

We use the sample mean of $y_{h,t}$, that is $\bar{y}_t = \sum_h y_{h,t}/N$, as an estimate of ξ_t. We estimate the variance of permanent aggregate shocks, σ_u^2, by the sample variance of $\bar{y}_t - \bar{y}_{t-1}$ ($t = 2, \ldots, T$). Let $y_{h,t}^* = y_{h,t} - \bar{y}_t$. We estimate σ_w^2 and σ_e^2 as in Carroll and Samwick (1997).

3 Indirect Inference

3.1 Estimation Procedure

The indirect inference procedure explained in the main text is implemented as follows. For each group g, we simulate the lifecycle model on a grid of preference parameters. The grid is

defined by 12 values of the RRA ranging from 2 to 10, 11 values of the TPR ranging from -0.05 to 0.22, and 14 values of the EIS ranging from 0.1 and 2.5. The grid values of the RRA are 2, 3, 4, 4.5, 5, 5.5, 6, 6.5, 7, 8, 9, and 10. To contruct the grid values of the TPR, we assume that the patience parameter $\delta \in \{0.80, 0.89, 0.92, 0.94, 0.96, 0.97, 0.98, 0.99, 1.00, 1.05\}$, so that $TPR = -\ln(\delta)$ is contained in $\{-0.05, 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.06, 0.08, 0.11, 0.16, 0.22\}$. The grid values of the EIS are 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2, and 2.5. Overall, the grid contains 1,848 $(= 12 \times 11 \times 14)$ parameter vectors θ.

For each vector θ on the grid, we calculate the value of the objective function:

$$[\tilde{\mu}_S^g(\theta) - \hat{\mu}^g]' \ \Omega \ [\tilde{\mu}_S^g(\theta) - \hat{\mu}^g],$$

where Ω is the weighting matrix defined in the main text.

We next evaluate the objective function on a finer grid defined as follows. The RRA grid has a grid step of 0.01 and contains 81 equally-spaced grid points ranging from 2 to 10. The EIS grid has grid step of 0.01 and contains 241 values of the EIS ranging from 0.1 to 2.5. We consider an evenly spaced grid of the patience parameter δ ranging from 0.8 to 1.05 with a grid step of 0.001, which generates a TPR grid containing 251 values of the TPR ranging from -0.05 to 0.22. The finer grid therefore contain 4,899,771 $(= 81 \times 241 \times 251)$ preference parameters. We evaluate the objective function on the finer grid by interpolating the values computed on the original grid. We use modified Akima cubic Hermite interpolation, which is known to reduce interpolation overshoots and oscillations compared to standard spline methods.

For each group, we obtain the indirect inference estimator by determining the parameter vector on the finer grid that minimizes the objective function. This value may occasionally be slightly negative due to interpolation error.

For inference purposes, such as calculations of the root mean squared error or the Jacobian matrix, we compute each of the 16 auxiliary statistics by a separate interpolation. These interpolations are based on a cubic spline using not-a-knot end conditions.

3.2 Hypothesis Testing

3.2.1 Group-Specific Tests

In Table 9 of the main text, we test null hypotheses of the form

$$\mathbf{H_0} : R(\theta^g) = 0, \tag{13}$$

where $R(\theta^g)$ is a column vector function of dimension r.

Since $\sqrt{N^g}(\hat{\theta}^g - \theta^g) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}(0, V^g)$, the delta method implies that

$$\sqrt{N^g} R(\hat{\theta}^g) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}\left[0, \frac{\partial R}{\partial \theta'}(\hat{\theta}^g) \ V^g \ \frac{\partial R'}{\partial \theta}(\hat{\theta}^g)\right]$$

under the null. In Table 9, we run χ^2 tests based on

$$N^g \ R(\hat{\theta}^g)' \ \left[\frac{\partial R}{\partial \theta'}(\hat{\theta}^g) \ \hat{V}^g \ \frac{\partial R'}{\partial \theta}(\hat{\theta}^g)\right]^{-1} R(\hat{\theta}^g) \xrightarrow{d} \chi^2(r), \tag{14}$$

where $\hat{V}^g$ is defined in the main text.

Expected utility. Following this methodology, we test in each group g the null hypothesis that households in the group exhibit expect utility:

$$\mathbf{H_0} : \psi^g = 1/\gamma^g.$$

The restriction function is $R(\theta^g) = \gamma^g \psi^g - 1$, where $\theta^g = (\delta^g, \gamma^g, \psi^g)'$. The Jacobian matrix of R is the 1×3 vector

$$\frac{\partial R}{\partial \theta'}(\theta^g) = (0, \psi^g, \gamma^g)$$

under the null hypothesis. The corresponding χ^2 tests are reported in Table 9.

Time Preference Rate. Since $TPR^g = -\ln(\beta^g)$, the delta method implies that the variance of TPR is the variance of beta divided by the squared of beta: $Var(\widehat{TPR^g}) \approx Var(\hat{\beta}^g)/(\hat{\beta}^g)^2$. This result allows us to test hypotheses on the time preference rate reported in Table 9 of the main text.

3.2.2 Tests Involving All Groups

In Table 9, we also test restrictions involving the preference parameters of all groups. For instance, we assess if the vector of preference parameters, θ^g, or each of its components, are homogeneous across groups. These tests are conducted as follows.

Let $N = N^1 + ... + N^G$ denote the total number of observations, and let

$$k^g = N^g/N$$

denote the fraction of observations in group g. We stack the group-level parameters into

$$\theta = \begin{pmatrix} \theta^1 \\ \vdots \\ \theta^G \end{pmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{\theta} = \begin{pmatrix} \hat{\theta}^1 \\ \vdots \\ \hat{\theta}^G \end{pmatrix}.$$

Since $\sqrt{N^g}(\hat{\theta}^g - \theta^g) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}(0, V^g)$, we infer that $\sqrt{N}(\hat{\theta}^g - \theta^g) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}(0, V^g/k_g)$ and therefore

$$\sqrt{N}(\hat{\theta} - \theta) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}(0, V),$$

where

$$V = \begin{pmatrix} V^1/k^1 & & \\ & \ddots & \\ & & V^G/k^G \end{pmatrix}.$$

The finite-sample estimator is

$$\hat{V} = \begin{pmatrix} \hat{V}^1/k^1 & & \\ & \ddots & \\ & & \hat{V}^G/k^G \end{pmatrix}, \tag{15}$$

where $\hat{V}_1, ..., \hat{V}_G$ are defined in the main text.

We consider the null hypothesis

$$\mathbf{H_0} : R(\theta) = 0, \tag{16}$$

where $R(\cdot)$ is a column vector function of dimension r. Under the null, the delta method implies that

$$\sqrt{N}R(\hat{\theta}) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{N}\left[0, \frac{\partial R}{\partial \theta'}(\theta) \, V \, \frac{\partial R'}{\partial \theta}(\theta)\right] \tag{17}$$

and

$$N \, R(\hat{\theta})' \left[\frac{\partial R}{\partial \theta'}(\hat{\theta}) \, \hat{V} \, \frac{\partial R'}{\partial \theta}(\hat{\theta})\right]^{-1} R(\hat{\theta}) \xrightarrow{d} \chi^2(r). \tag{18}$$

The result holds for fixed proportions $k^1, ..., k^G$, and for a total number of observations N going to infinity.

Equality of Group-Level Parameters to the Cross-Sectional Mean. Following this methodology, we test the null hypothesis:

$$\mathbf{H_0} : \theta^g = \sum_{i=1}^{G} k^i \, \theta^i,$$

where θ^i and k^i denote the parameter vector and relative size of each group i. The restriction function is

$$R^g(\theta) = \theta^g - \sum_{i=1}^{G} k^i \ \theta^i.$$

Let I_3 denote the identity matrix of size 3, let e_g denote the row vector of dimension G with g^{th} element equal to unity and other elements equal to 0, and let $k = (k^1, ..., k^G)$. We note that

$$\theta^g = (e_g \otimes I_3)\theta,$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{G} k^i \theta^i = (k \otimes I_3)\theta,$$

The restriction function can therefore be rewritten in matrix form as

$$R^g(\theta) = A^g \ \theta,$$

where

$$A^g = (e_g - k) \otimes I_3$$

for every g.[13] The corresponding tests based on (17) and (18) are reported in Table 9.

4   Measuring Parameter Heterogeneity

We denote by $\mathbb{E}$ the expectation operator computed across random realization of income shocks and by E^* the cross-sectional expectation operator. The mean preference parameter vector in the population is $\mu_\theta = E^*(\theta) = \sum_{g=1}^{G} k^g \ \theta^g$, where k^g is the population share of group g and θ^g is the preference vector of households in the group. The cross-sectional variance-covariance matrix of the preference vector is $V_\theta = E^*[(\theta - \mu_\theta)(\theta - \mu_\theta)']$. Our objective is to estimate V_θ from the group-level indirect inference estimators $\hat{\theta}^g$ ($g = 1, \ldots, G$) defined in the main text, controlling for estimation error.

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[13]For instance if $g = 1$ and $G = 2$, we have $e_1 - k = (1 - k^1, -k^2)$,

$$A^1 = \begin{bmatrix} 1 - k^1 & & & -k^2 & & \\ & 1 - k^1 & & & -k^2 & \\ & & 1 - k^1 & & & -k^2 \end{bmatrix},$$

so that $A^1\theta = (1 - k^1)\theta^1 - k^2\theta^2$.

The estimation of V_θ requires us to take account of estimation noise. We let

$$(\hat\theta^g - \mu_\theta)(\hat\theta^g - \mu_\theta)' = (\hat\theta^g - \theta^g)(\hat\theta^g - \theta^g)' + (\theta^g - \mu_\theta)(\theta^g - \mu_\theta)'$$
$$+(\hat\theta^g - \theta^g)(\theta^g - \mu_\theta)' + (\theta^g - \mu_\theta)(\hat\theta^g - \theta^g)'.$$

We take the expectations across realization of income shocks:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[(\hat\theta^g - \mu_\theta)(\hat\theta^g - \mu_\theta)'\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[(\hat\theta^g - \theta^g)(\hat\theta^g - \theta^g)'\right] + (\theta^g - \mu_\theta)(\theta^g - \mu_\theta)'$$
$$+\mathbb{E}(\hat\theta^g - \theta^g)\ (\theta^g - \mu_\theta)' + (\theta^g - \mu_\theta)\ \mathbb{E}(\hat\theta^g - \theta^g)'.$$

We apply the cross-sectional expectation operator and obtain:

$$\Psi^{(1)} = \Psi^{(2)} + V_\theta + \Psi^{(3)} + [\Psi^{(3)}]', \tag{19}$$

where

$$\Psi^{(1)} = E^*\mathbb{E}\left[(\hat\theta^g - \mu_\theta)(\hat\theta^g - \mu_\theta)'\right]$$
$$\Psi^{(3)} = E^*\left[\mathbb{E}(\hat\theta^g - \theta^g)\ (\theta^g - \mu_\theta)'\right].$$

When the estimators are unbiased, equation (19) is equivalent to

$$E^*\mathbb{E}\left[(\hat\theta^g - \mu_\theta)(\hat\theta^g - \mu_\theta)'\right] = E^*\left[Var(\hat\theta^g)\right] + V_\theta,$$

as the law of total variance implies.

In finite samples, we estimate V_θ by as follows. First, we estimate μ_θ by the size-weighted mean of group estimates:

$$\bar\theta = \sum_g k^g\ \hat\theta^g,$$

where $k^g = N^g/(\sum_k N^k)$ is the share of group g in the population. The estimator $\bar\theta$ is a consistent estimator of μ_θ as the group sizes $N^1, \ldots, N^G$ go to infinity.

Second, we estimate $\Psi^{(1)}$ by the size-weighted variance of group estimates:

$$\hat\Phi^{(1)} = \sum_{g=1}^G k^g\ (\hat\theta^g - \bar\theta)\ (\hat\theta^g - \bar\theta)'.$$

We estimate $E^*\left[Var(\hat\theta^g)\right]$ by the average variance-covariance matrix of $\hat\theta^g$:

$$\hat\Phi^{(2)} = \sum_{g=1}^G k^g\ \frac{\hat V^g}{N^g},$$

19

where $\hat{V}^g$ is the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix defined in the main text. We therefore estimate the variance-covariance of θ by

$$\hat{V}_\theta = \hat{\Phi}^{(1)} - \hat{\Phi}^{(2)}.$$

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Table A.1: Sizes of Education and Income Risk Categories

	No High School	High School	Post-High School	All
Low	17,980	43,613	66,006	127,599
Medium	10,531	51,810	28,530	90,871
High	16,212	28,590	28,216	73,018
All	44,723	124,013	122,752	291,488

This table reports the number of households in groups with 3 levels of education and working in sectors with 3 levels of income volatility given in Table 2 of the main text, and for aggregates of these categories.

Table A.2: Employment Sectors of Education and Income Risk Categories

	No High School	High School	Post-High School
Low	Mining	Mining	Mining
	Manufacturing	Public	Public
	Public	Manufacturing	Manufacturing
	Healthcare	Healthcare	Healthcare
Medium	Education	Financial	Education
	Financial	Education	Construction
	Transport	Transport	Other
	Wholesale	Construction	Transport
High	Other	Wholesale	Financial
	Construction	Real Estate	Wholesale
	Real Estate	Other	Real Estate
	Hotels	Hotels	Hotels

This table reports the classification of employment sectors into 3 levels of income volatility, separately for households with 3 levels of education. Sectors are listed in ascending order of income volatility within each education level.

Table A.3: Adjusting Estimated Parameter Heterogeneity for Estimation Noise

	(1) RRA	(2) TPR (%)	(3) EIS
Unadjusted	0.468	6.03	0.959
Adjusted by winsorized asymptotic standard errors	0.465	3.68	0.545
Adjusted by Monte Carlo standard errors	0.467	5.89	0.907

This table reports the cross-sectional standard deviations of parameter estimates with two alternative adjustments for estimation noise. Unadjusted standard deviations, as in Table 5 of the paper, are reported in the first row. The second row reports standard deviations subtracting the cross-sectional average squared asymptotic standard error, after winsorizing asymptotic standard errors at the 90th percentile of the cross-sectional distribution. The third row reports standard deviations subtracting the cross-sectional average squared Monte Carlo standard error. As discussed in the text, Monte Carlo standard errors are much smaller than asymptotic standard errors but this reflects the limited extent of within-group household-level heterogeneity considered in the Monte Carlo analysis.

Table A.4: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Distributions of Estimated Preference Parameters and Group Financial Characteristics, Excluding High Initial WY Groups

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	10%	25%	75%	90%
RRA	5.26	5.30	0.45	4.70	4.90	5.50	5.90
TPR (%)	6.36	4.08	6.21	0.80	3.25	8.12	18.63
EIS	0.88	0.35	0.92	0.10	0.10	1.78	2.50
Average RS	0.66	0.63	0.17	0.46	0.53	0.76	0.92
Initial WY	3.05	2.83	2.01	0.60	1.64	4.60	7.10
Growth of WY	1.09	1.08	0.04	1.04	1.06	1.11	1.15
Convexity of WY	0.23	0.22	0.09	0.15	0.18	0.27	0.32

This table is an equivalent of Table 5 excluding high initial WY groups. This table reports the mean, median, standard deviation, and 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of estimated preference parameters and group financial characteristics. All statistics weight groups by their size to recover the underlying cross-sectional distributions at the household level. Growth of WY is defined in equation (17) and convexity of WY is defined in equation (18) in the text. There are 3,623 groups containing 262,422 households.

Table A.5: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Correlations of Estimated Preference Parameters and Group Financial Characteristics, Excluding High Initial WY Groups

	RRA	TPR	EIS	Average RS	Initial WY	Growth of WY	Convexity of WY
RRA	1.000						
TPR	-0.279***	1.000					
EIS	0.146***	-0.257***	1.000				
Average RS	-0.439***	0.464***	-0.060***	1.000			
Initial WY	0.068***	-0.448***	0.070***	-0.641***	1.000		
Growth of WY	-0.086***	0.370***	-0.059***	0.619***	-0.717***	1.000	
Convexity of WY	-0.093***	0.101***	-0.021***	0.190***	-0.043***	0.161***	1.000

This table is an equivalent of Table 6 excluding high initial WY groups. This table reports the cross-sectional correlations across estimated preference parameters and group financial characteristics. Correlations weight groups by their size to recover the underlying cross-sectional correlations at the household level. Growth of WY is defined in equation (17) and convexity of WY is defined in equation (18) in the text. Statistical significance levels of correlation coefficients are indicated with stars: * denotes 1-5%, ** 0.1-1%, *** less than 0.1% significance. There are 3,623 groups containing 262,422 households.

Table A.6: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Regressions of Estimated Preference Parameters on Group Financial Characteristics, Excluding High Initial WY Groups

	(1) RRA	(2) RRA	(3) TPR	(4) TPR	(5) EIS	(6) EIS
Average RS	-1.872***	-1.949***	0.104***	0.093***	-0.098	-0.131
	(0.062)	(0.040)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.118)	(0.122)
Initial WY	-0.063***	-0.068***	-0.008***	-0.005***	0.024	0.016
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Growth of WY	1.633***	1.888***	-0.006	0.136**	-0.178	-0.413
	(0.346)	(0.407)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.557)	(0.567)
Convexity of WY	0.027	-0.273***	0.024	0.021	-0.136	-0.094
	(0.075)	(0.047)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.169)	(0.167)
Constant	4.919***	4.746***	0.020	-0.123**	1.099	1.328*
	(0.380)	(0.434)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.634)	(0.642)
Control variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.281	0.879	0.255	0.289	0.006	0.011

This table is an equivalent of Table 7 excluding high initial WY groups. This table reports the cross-sectional regression coefficients across estimated preference parameters and group financial characteristics. All regressions weight groups by their size, to recover the underlying cross-sectional relationships at the household level. Growth of WY is defined in equation (17) and convexity of WY is defined in equation (18) in the text. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and statistical significance levels are indicated with stars: * denotes 1-5%, ** 0.1-1%, *** less than 0.1% significance. There are 3,623 groups containing 262,422 households. Control variables are 9 income risk/education categories and cohort fixed effects.

Table A.7: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Regressions of Preference Parameters on Income Volatility and Education, Excluding High Initial WY Groups

	(1) RRA	(2) TPR	(3) EIS
Total income volatility	-6.799*** (0.239)	-0.354*** (0.046)	0.924 (0.750)
High school	-0.511*** (0.018)	0.024*** (0.003)	-0.102* (0.047)
Post-high school	-0.608*** (0.015)	0.010*** (0.003)	-0.034 (0.049)
Constant	6.637*** (0.053)	0.136*** (0.011)	0.755*** (0.163)
Cohort dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.451	0.074	0.004

This table is an equivalent of Table 8 excluding high initial WY groups. This table reports the cross-sectional regression coefficients across estimated preference parameters and group characteristics including the total income volatility (in natural units), and dummies for high-school and post-high-school education. All regressions weight groups by their size, to recover the underlying cross-sectional relationships at the household level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and statistical significance levels are indicated with stars: * denotes 1-5%, ** 0.1-1%, *** less than 0.1% significance. There are 3,623 groups containing 262,422 households.

Table A.8: Size-Weighted Statistical Test Results for Estimated Preference Parameters, Excluding High Initial WY Groups

Condition	Fraction of the Population
TPR < 0	0.071
Reject null that TPR > 0	0.024
Reject null that TPR < 0	0.617
Reject null that TPR $= 0$	0.598
EIS < 1	0.647
Reject null that EIS > 1	0.534
Reject null that EIS < 1	0.172
Reject null that EIS $= 1$	0.677
EIS $< 1/$RRA	0.374
Reject null that EIS $> 1/$RRA	0.061
Reject null that EIS $< 1/$RRA	0.341
Reject null that EIS $= 1/$RRA	0.354
Reject null that RRA $=$ mean(RRA)	0.898
Reject null that TPR $=$ mean(TPR)	0.489
Reject null that EIS $=$ mean(EIS)	0.673
Reject the joint null of the above three rows	0.983
Reject null that RRA $=$ median(RRA)	0.898
Reject null that TPR $=$ median(TPR)	0.226
Reject null that EIS $=$ median(EIS)	0.472

This table is an equivalent of Table 9 excluding high initial WY groups. This table reports the size-weighted fraction of Swedish household groups, or equivalently the fraction of Swedish households, for which each condition stated in the row label applies. All hypothesis test rejections are at the 5% significance level. Hypothesis tests in the bottom panel treat the cross-sectional median preference parameter as known rather than estimated. There are 3,623 groups containing 262,422 households.

Table A.9: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Distributions of Estimated Preference Parameters and Group Financial Characteristics, Assuming a Sharpe Ratio of 0.4

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	10%	25%	75%	90%
RRA	7.94	7.90	0.74	7.00	7.40	8.40	9.00
TPR (%)	8.69	6.19	6.83	2.12	4.08	12.22	21.07
EIS	0.67	0.27	0.79	0.10	0.10	0.85	2.33
Average RS	0.65	0.62	0.17	0.45	0.52	0.75	0.89
Initial WY	4.13	2.88	3.78	0.96	1.69	4.71	7.67
Growth of WY	1.08	1.07	0.05	1.03	1.05	1.10	1.14
Convexity of WY	0.24	0.23	0.10	0.15	0.19	0.28	0.34

This table is an equivalent of Table 5, assuming a higher Sharpe ratio of 0.4. This table reports the mean, median, standard deviation, and 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of estimated preference parameters and group financial characteristics. All statistics weight groups by their size to recover the underlying cross-sectional distributions at the household level. Growth of WY is defined in equation (17) and convexity of WY is defined in equation (18) in the text. There are 4,151 groups containing 291,488 households.

Table A.10: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Correlations of Estimated Preference Parameters and Group Financial Characteristics, Assuming a Sharpe Ratio of 0.4

	RRA	TPR	EIS	Average RS	Initial WY	Growth of WY	Convexity of WY
RRA	1.000						
TPR	-0.354***	1.000					
EIS	0.075***	-0.352***	1.000				
Average RS	-0.381***	0.414***	0.107***	1.000			
Initial WY	-0.100***	-0.335***	0.210***	-0.524***	1.000		
Growth of WY	0.069***	0.179***	0.096***	0.621***	-0.685***	1.000	
Convexity of WY	-0.194***	0.017***	0.097***	0.163***	0.182***	0.029***	1.000

This table is an equivalent of Table 6, assuming a higher Sharpe ratio of 0.4. This table reports the cross-sectional correlations across estimated preference parameters and group financial characteristics. Correlations weight groups by their size to recover the underlying cross-sectional correlations at the household level. Growth of WY is defined in equation (17) and convexity of WY is defined in equation (18) in the text. Statistical significance levels of correlation coefficients are indicated with stars: * denotes 1-5%, ** 0.1-1%, *** less than 0.1% significance. There are 4,151 groups containing 291,488 households.

Table A.11: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Regressions of Estimated Preference Parameters on Group Financial Characteristics, Assuming a Sharpe Ratio of 0.4

	(1) RRA	(2) RRA	(3) TPR	(4) TPR	(5) EIS	(6) EIS
Average RS	-3.040***	-3.216***	0.171***	0.172***	0.813***	0.693***
	(0.112)	(0.104)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.119)	(0.132)
Initial WY	-0.042***	-0.034***	-0.006***	-0.005***	0.119***	0.124***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Growth of WY	5.923***	7.076***	-0.468***	-0.399***	6.469***	6.998***
	(0.731)	(0.926)	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.782)	(0.893)
Convexity of WY	-0.371**	-0.746***	0.010	0.002	-0.373*	-0.385*
	(0.122)	(0.087)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.155)	(0.154)
Constant	3.781***	2.730**	0.503***	0.429***	-7.253***	-7.679***
	(0.768)	(0.957)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.819)	(0.932)
Control variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.328	0.829	0.234	0.276	0.170	0.180

This table is an equivalent of Table 7, assuming a higher Sharpe ratio of 0.4. This table reports the cross-sectional regression coefficients across estimated preference parameters and group financial characteristics. All regressions weight groups by their size, to recover the underlying cross-sectional relationships at the household level. Growth of WY is defined in equation (17) and convexity of WY is defined in equation (18) in the text. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and statistical significance levels are indicated with stars: * denotes 1-5%, ** 0.1-1%, *** less than 0.1% significance. There are 4,151 groups containing 291,488 households. Control variables are 9 income risk/education categories and cohort fixed effects.

Table A.12: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Regressions of Preference Parameters on Income Volatility and Education, Assuming a Sharpe Ratio of 0.4

	(1) RRA	(2) TPR	(3) EIS
Total income volatility	-10.668*** (0.373)	-0.339*** (0.048)	1.174* (0.564)
High school	-0.713*** (0.028)	0.032*** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.037)
Post-high school	-0.864*** (0.024)	0.024*** (0.003)	-0.067* (0.034)
Constant	10.120*** (0.078)	0.138*** (0.010)	0.568*** (0.116)
Cohort dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.353	0.081	0.007

This table is an equivalent of Table 8, assuming a higher Sharpe ratio of 0.4. This table reports the cross-sectional regression coefficients across estimated preference parameters and group characteristics including the total income volatility (in natural units), and dummies for high-school and post-high-school education. All regressions weight groups by their size, to recover the underlying cross-sectional relationships at the household level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and statistical significance levels are indicated with stars: * denotes 1-5%, ** 0.1-1%, *** less than 0.1% significance. There are 4,151 groups containing 291,488 households.

Table A.13: Size-Weighted Statistical Test Results for Estimated Preference Parameters, Assuming a Sharpe Ratio of 0.4

Condition	Fraction of the Population
TPR < 0	0.033
Reject null that TPR > 0	0.013
Reject null that TPR < 0	0.577
Reject null that TPR = 0	0.528
EIS < 1	0.757
Reject null that EIS > 1	0.521
Reject null that EIS < 1	0.068
Reject null that EIS = 1	0.558
EIS < 1/RRA	0.377
Reject null that EIS > 1/RRA	0.002
Reject null that EIS < 1/RRA	0.177
Reject null that EIS = 1/RRA	0.158
Reject null that RRA = mean(RRA)	0.746
Reject null that TPR = mean(TPR)	0.370
Reject null that EIS = mean(EIS)	0.471
Reject the joint null of the above three rows	0.931
Reject null that RRA = median(RRA)	0.764
Reject null that TPR = median(TPR)	0.236
Reject null that EIS = median(EIS)	0.281

This table is an equivalent of Table 9, assuming a higher Sharpe ratio of 0.4. This table reports the size-weighted fraction of Swedish household groups, or equivalently the fraction of Swedish households, for which each condition stated in the row label applies. All hypothesis test rejections are at the 5% significance level. Hypothesis tests in the bottom panel treat the cross-sectional median preference parameter as known rather than estimated. There are 4,151 groups containing 291,488 households.

Table A.14: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Distributions of Estimated Preference Parameters and Group Financial Characteristics, Assuming Heterogeneous Beliefs

	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	10%	25%	75%	90%
RRA	5.25	5.40	1.91	2.90	3.00	6.00	8.00
TPR (%)	7.16	4.29	6.27	2.02	3.46	10.31	18.15
EIS	0.97	0.40	0.97	0.10	0.10	1.99	2.50
Average RS	0.65	0.62	0.17	0.45	0.52	0.75	0.89
Initial WY	4.13	2.88	3.78	0.96	1.69	4.71	7.67
Growth of WY	1.08	1.07	0.05	1.03	1.05	1.10	1.14
Convexity of WY	0.24	0.23	0.10	0.15	0.19	0.28	0.34

This table is an equivalent of Table 5, allowing three possible household beliefs about the Sharpe ratio, that it equals 0.15, 0.26, or 0.40. For each group we pick the Sharpe ratio and preference parameters that minimize the objective function. This table reports the mean, median, standard deviation, and 10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th percentiles of estimated preference parameters and group financial characteristics. All statistics weight groups by their size to recover the underlying cross-sectional distributions at the household level. Growth of WY is defined in equation (17) and convexity of WY is defined in equation (18) in the text. There are 4,151 groups containing 291,488 households.

Table A.15: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Correlations of Estimated Preference Parameters and Group Financial Characteristics, Assuming Heterogeneous Beliefs

	RRA	TPR	EIS	Average RS	Initial WY	Growth of WY	Convexity of WY
RRA	1.000						
TPR	-0.196***	1.000					
EIS	-0.079***	-0.378***	1.000				
Average RS	-0.382***	0.408***	-0.146***	1.000			
Initial WY	0.082***	-0.332***	0.362***	-0.524***	1.000		
Growth of WY	-0.152***	0.276***	-0.142***	0.621***	-0.685***	1.000	
Convexity of WY	-0.068***	0.051***	0.057***	0.163***	0.182***	0.029***	1.000

This table is an equivalent of Table 6, allowing three possible household beliefs about the Sharpe ratio, that it equals 0.15, 0.26, or 0.40. For each group we pick the Sharpe ratio and preference parameters that minimize the objective function. This table reports the cross-sectional correlations across estimated preference parameters and group financial characteristics. Correlations weight groups by their size to recover the underlying cross-sectional correlations at the household level. Growth of WY is defined in equation (17) and convexity of WY is defined in equation (18) in the text. Statistical significance levels of correlation coefficients are indicated with stars: * denotes 1-5%, ** 0.1-1%, *** less than 0.1% significance. There are 4,151 groups containing 291,488 households.

Table A.16: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Regressions of Estimated Preference Parameters on Group Financial Characteristics, Assuming Heterogeneous Beliefs

	(1) RRA	(2) RRA	(3) TPR	(4) TPR	(5) EIS	(6) EIS
Average RS	-5.505***	-5.463***	0.123***	0.105***	-0.015	0.119
	(0.236)	(0.240)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.118)	(0.121)
Initial WY	-0.076***	-0.075***	-0.004***	-0.003***	0.132***	0.126***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Growth of WY	2.254*	2.432*	-0.120*	-0.010	4.513***	3.766***
	(1.100)	(1.218)	(0.047)	(0.041)	(0.695)	(0.677)
Convexity of WY	0.752*	0.332	0.024*	0.026*	-0.412**	-0.415**
	(0.326)	(0.333)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.147)	(0.145)
Constant	6.526***	5.758***	0.130**	0.030	-4.348***	-3.853***
	(1.162)	(1.286)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.729)	(0.710)
Control variables	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.168	0.304	0.190	0.237	0.154	0.171

This table is an equivalent of Table 7, allowing three possible household beliefs about the Sharpe ratio, that it equals 0.15, 0.26, or 0.40. For each group we pick the Sharpe ratio and preference parameters that minimize the objective function. This table reports the cross-sectional regression coefficients across estimated preference parameters and group financial characteristics. All regressions weight groups by their size, to recover the underlying cross-sectional relationships at the household level. Growth of WY is defined in equation (17) and convexity of WY is defined in equation (18) in the text. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and statistical significance levels are indicated with stars: * denotes 1-5%, ** 0.1-1%, *** less than 0.1% significance. There are 4,151 groups containing 291,488 households. Control variables are 9 income risk/education categories and cohort fixed effects.

Table A.17: Size-Weighted Cross-Sectional Regressions of Preference Parameters on Income Volatility and Education, Assuming Heterogeneous Beliefs

	(1) RRA	(2) TPR	(3) EIS
Total income volatility	-10.400*** (1.448)	-0.318*** (0.045)	4.946*** (0.712)
High school	-1.077*** (0.095)	0.029*** (0.003)	-0.205*** (0.046)
Post-high school	-1.066*** (0.081)	0.016*** (0.003)	-0.044 (0.046)
Constant	7.213*** (0.295)	0.130*** (0.010)	-0.006 (0.148)
Cohort dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.092	0.084	0.032

This table is an equivalent of Table 8, allowing three possible household beliefs about the Sharpe ratio, that it equals 0.15, 0.26, or 0.40. For each group we pick the Sharpe ratio and preference parameters that minimize the objective function. This table reports the cross-sectional regression coefficients across estimated preference parameters and group characteristics including the total income volatility (in natural units), and dummies for high-school and post-high-school education. All regressions weight groups by their size, to recover the underlying cross-sectional relationships at the household level. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and statistical significance levels are indicated with stars: * denotes 1-5%, ** 0.1-1%, *** less than 0.1% significance. There are 4,151 groups containing 291,488 households.

Table A.18: Size-Weighted Statistical Test Results for Estimated Preference Parameters, Assuming Heterogeneous Beliefs

Condition	Fraction of the Population
TPR < 0	0.050
Reject null that TPR > 0	0.017
Reject null that TPR < 0	0.650
Reject null that TPR $= 0$	0.625
EIS < 1	0.612
Reject null that EIS > 1	0.492
Reject null that EIS < 1	0.162
Reject null that EIS $= 1$	0.625
EIS $< 1/$RRA	0.391
Reject null that EIS $> 1/$RRA	0.133
Reject null that EIS $< 1/$RRA	0.289
Reject null that EIS $= 1/$RRA	0.385
Reject null that RRA $=$ mean(RRA)	0.983
Reject null that TPR $=$ mean(TPR)	0.511
Reject null that EIS $=$ mean(EIS)	0.616
Reject the joint null of the above three rows	0.999
Reject null that RRA $=$ median(RRA)	0.925
Reject null that TPR $=$ median(TPR)	0.255
Reject null that EIS $=$ median(EIS)	0.531

This table is an equivalent of Table 9, allowing three possible household beliefs about the Sharpe ratio, that it equals 0.15, 0.26, or 0.40. For each group we pick the Sharpe ratio and preference parameters that minimize the objective function. This table reports the size-weighted fraction of Swedish household groups, or equivalently the fraction of Swedish households, for which each condition stated in the row label applies. All hypothesis test rejections are at the 5% significance level. Hypothesis tests in the bottom panel treat the cross-sectional median preference parameter as known rather than estimated. There are 4,151 groups containing 291,488 households.